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Agility and Appropriateness: Matching Shift to Scale 
 
ABSTRACT 
Agility is organizational shape-shifting in face of complex operating 
environments.  Command is the guiding hand for the shape-shifting. As the DOD 
CCRP community has noted, agility is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that, if 
applied effectively, produces force multiplier effects of considerable value.   
However, achieving agility in command only works in very few organizations, and 
often not for very long.  This paper describes and analyzes the characteristics of 
those organizations that can best apply agility in command, staff and planning.   
 
The key descriptor of those characteristics is appropriateness, a term defining 
the right scale for the applicable operating environment.  Appropriateness has 
long been associated with technologies; however, in the current and foreseeable 
high entropic operating environments of the United States military and 
interagency, the term must be extended to include doctrine and force structure.   
The proposed paper presents case studies of appropriateness and agility to 
demonstrate both the extraordinary advantages enabled by coupling these 
concepts, and the disastrous results of ignoring both.  The paper concludes by 





 What kind of organization can apply agility?  Can any organization apply it?  Are 
there certain characteristics that enhance an organization’s ability to be agile?  These 
are the key questions to be addressed in this paper.  First, it is essential to identify just 
what agility in command means.   Next, the discussion moves to answering whether all, 
some or any organizations, focusing on those in the military, can achieve and maintain 
agility in command.   The answer to this question leads to assessing what 
characteristic(s) are necessary for organizations to effectively use agility.   The 
characteristic of note in this paper is appropriateness, succinctly defined as the 
situational fit of size, doctrine, training, equipment, manpower, organization, resources, 
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and strategy.   The paper then provides case studies to illustrate four combinations of 
agility and appropriateness.  From these are drawn the major conclusion that one size 
does not and cannot enhance agility in all military situations.  In an era that maintains 
that irregular warfare, conventional warfare, and stability, security, transition and 
reconstruction operations are to be all held as equal in priority, this conclusion bodes ill 
for those who deal with developing the necessary resources to support United States 
national security strategy.1  
 
 
WHAT IS AGILITY? 
 The dictionary refers to agility as quick and easy movement.  Synonyms include 
nimble, dexterous, deftness and rapidity of movement.  Antonyms refer to sluggish, 
torpid and lethargic.  Curiously, in the version of Webster’s New World Dictionary2 
consulted here, agility is followed by a reference to Agincourt, a battle of the Hundred 
Years’ War in which a relatively nimble and deft English force soundly defeated a 
sluggish (because of terrain and weather conditions) French force.  Agility could hardly 
find a better example for illustration.   
 However, the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has expanded the concept of agility.   David Alberts 
summarizes the CCRP discussion on agility calling it a “gold standard,” a “theme,” a 
                                          
1 The Department of Defense Directive, 3000.05, titled “Military Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” dated November 28, 2005, is 
the cornerstone document for SSTR policy.   Paragraph 4.1 establishes the co-equality of 
SSTR operations with combat operations as DoD policy.  
2 1958 edition; Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. 
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“characteristic,” and a “function” among other descriptors of new “edge” organizations, 
especially with respect to command and control.3   The summary reads like an 
illustration of the old fable of the blind wise men trying to describe an elephant, an 
animal they have never seen; many aspects of the concept are identified, but not the 
concept itself.  Atkinson and Moffat are more precise; they define agility as the variety 
of system behaviors available to  a given system – like a military command and control 
organization or unit.4  This is variety of the type very specifically described and 
bounded by H. Ross Ashby in his law of requisite variety, described as: “for this system 
to be in control, the variety of the controllers (i.e. the management system) must 
match the variety of the system.”5  Actually, the Atkinson and Moffatt definition is an 
abbreviated and specific case of Ashby’s Law.  More generally, the Law calls for the 
variety of the controller to at least match the variety of the system, including an 
accounting for entropic effects inevitably due to any system activity.6   Thus, according
Atkinson and Moffatt, if the control at least matches the variety of the system, the 
control can be
 
 said to be agile.   
                                         
 The definition of agility being system variety is  sophisticated and measurable.  It 
avoids the verbal “fog” associated with other concepts.  No longer are needed the so-
called seven characteristics of agility addressed in earlier CCRP publications; this would 
be dangerously scientifically tautological to a trivial degree in that one would have 
 
3 David Alberts in the Preface to Simon Reay Atkinson and James Moffatt, The Agile 
Organization: From Informal Networks to Complex Effects and Agility; Washington: 
Command and Control Research Program, 2005, pages xix-xxi. 
4 Ibid, page 126. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See Jonathan Czarnecki, “The Failed Thermostat: The Illusion of Control in an Information 
Rich Age,” paper presented at 13th ICCRTS, Seattle, Washington, 2008, page 8. 
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characteristics measuring characteristics.  An infinite logic regression thus ensues and 
no progress or verification is possible. 
AGILITY IN COMMAND 
 One of the key conclusions of the work of Atkinson and Moffatt is that not all 
organizations can be agile.  Indeed, most are not.  Of particular interest here are 
military organizations and, as Atkinson and Moffatt point out very clearly, these are 
some of least agile organizations of all.  There are two scientific and logical reasons 
why this is so.   First, the system variety that is measured by agility represents the total 
potential agility of the system; no actual system, living or otherwise, can achieve its 
potential fully.  The reason is found in that ending element of Ashby’s Law, the basis of 
the Atkinson and Moffat definition of agility: entropy.  Every system activity or behavior 
engenders some dispersion of effort, some loss of energy, some loss of information.   
This means that no organization, unit, or command system can be perfectly agile.    
Still, imperfect agility that approximates the potential can be quite acceptable if 
that means a system’s agility is greater than a competitor’s or an opponent’s.   One 
cannot allow perfection to become the enemy of the good.  Unfortunately, this is where 
the second reason for most organization systems failing to be agile enters the 
argument.   That reason is this: because the agility of the system is measured within 
the system, the total potential agility can never be known, or alternatively, if the total 
potential agility is thought to be known, it can never be verified.  That reason is a logic 
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extension of Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and Proofs.7   Trying to assess or 
improve agility as system variety becomes a game of the dog chasing its tail.   
These reasons provide an understanding why command systems rarely achieve desired 
agility; the systems simply cannot know what is the desired agility  beforehand and, 
simultaneously, whether it is within the specific operating environmental system.   That 
some command or organizational systems appear agile while others pale by comparison 
either is due to circumstance or some other factor(s.)  Assuming that luck or fortune 
always plays some role in successful command systems, and cannot be understood 
except for the chance it represents,8 then the analyst interested in the agility in 
command must identify what supplemental factors exist to explain and/or enhance the 
idea.   
 Consider for illustration purposes a highly agile organizational command system 
in the military.  It has the ability to shift its operational variety very quickly in response 
to operating environmental system and opponent’s system changes.  Holding chance or 
uncertainty aside for the moment, can one argue that such a nimble system always 
would succeed in its missions?  Perhaps so, but there remains some nagging 
                                          
7 Gödel’s theorems and proof are found in his original paper, (translated) “On Formally 
Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems,” published in 
Monatshefte fur Mathematik und Physik, Vol. 38, pages 173-198.  Unless one is an 
experienced student of advanced mathematics, I do not recommend reading either the 
original in German or a translation.   The most scientific popular interpretation can be found 
in Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof; New York: New York University Press, 
1986.   
8 All the major works on military command and strategy discuss the role of chance, mostly 
with the intent on minimizing or eliminating it.  A few realize the futility of such effort, 
particularly in the extraordinarily complex realm of war.  Perhaps the most famous and best 
of these thinkers is Carl von Clausewitz, who famously added friction (entropy) and fog 
(uncertainty) to our lexicon of war.  Read his On War (Paret translation); Princeton, New 
Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1976. 
 6
possibilities for failure that the serious analyst must address: suppose the enemy is in 
overwhelming numbers; suppose the equipment and technology do not fit the 
environment (for example, think of heavy tanks in dense tropical jungle); suppose the 
doctrine does not exist or work (for example, think of the United States (U.S.) 
occupation of Iraq, 2004-2007); or, suppose the command system personnel are not 
trained for the situation faced (again think of Iraq).  These suppositions all have a 
common denominator: the agile command system, for one or more reasons, can fail 
because it does not fit the situation.  This “fit” or, in technology and ecology terms, 
“appropriateness” is the supplement or complement to agility that can ensure mission 
success. 
 
WHAT IS APPROPRIATENESS 
 Returning to the dictionary, appropriate as an adjective refers to suitability, 
fitness and propriety.   When one conducts an internet search using “appropriate” or 
“appropriateness,” he/she finds references across many disciplines, from health through 
technology to management to semiotic systems.   In all cases, the distinguishing facet 
of appropriateness is its proper fit to a given situation or environment.   An appropriate 
system is one that matches (or fits) the system components with its function and its 
operating environment.9  This is consistent with a classic approach to systems and 
planning introduced by Russell Ackoff, in which a functioning system can be understood 
to be appropriate when “the (system) parts fit and work together, not merely how well 
                                          
9 Ivo Janecka, “Is U.S. health care an appropriate system?  A strategic perspective from 
systems science,” Health Research Policy and Systems; Vol. 7, No. 1 (online.) 
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each performs when considered independently.”10  A major conclusion from this line of 
thinking is that the system is more than the sum of its parts.11 
 One major sub-field of study on this topic is Appropriate Technology.  In this 
instance, the field researches and designs solutions to highly complex problems 
(“messes” in Ackoff’s terminology) through the imposition of technologies and social 
changes that fit the environment.  These are scalable solutions that may sub-optimize a 
desired technology at a less-than-state-of-the-art level but maximizing the acceptability 
of the technology by the affected social group.   Appropriate Technology derives its 
name from its major proponent, an economist named E.F. Schumacher, who first 
identified the need for such approaches in the now classic text, Small is Beautiful: 
Economics as if People Mattered.12   The title provides the direction the author takes in 
his argument.   A second and different case of Appropriate Technology leading to 
Appropriate Finance is the mini-loan movement now expanding throughout developing 
countries.  Now technology is coupled with policy (requirements for loans) and 
information (money) to generate needed capital for emerging business people in these 
poor – and undercapitalized – countries; none of the parts of this system of finance is 
optimized.  The technology is simple and accessible to a community; the requirements 
probably would not pass muster for a loan in the U.S.; the actual money loaned is 
miniscule compared to a venture capital undertaking in the developed world.  However, 
taken together, the resulting system fits the environment in which it is implemented. 
                                          
10 Russell Ackoff, Redesigning the Future; New York: John Wily & Sons, 1973, pages 14-15. 
11 Ibid., page 13. 
12 Published in New York: Harper & Row, 1973.  Read Part III, “The Third World,” for the 
application of Appropriate Technology to problems of development. 
 
 8
 As alluded to in the above paragraph, appropriateness or appropriate systems 
refers to more than just technology; it refers to all facets of the organizational system: 
the technology, people, tasks, doctrine, strategy, process and structure.13 In fact, 
appropriateness is the organizational system characteristic that empowers 
organizational agility in the right place at the right time, given a specific system and 
environment.   Appropriateness is a necessary corollary to agility.  Together, these two 
system characteristics enable organizational shape-shifting to fit operating 
environmental changes.   They are the essential components for describing and defining 
adaptability.14    
AGILITY AND APPROPRIATENESS 
 One way to demonstrate both the connectedness and the distinctiveness of 
agility and appropriateness is to observe actual case studies that illustrate their 
characteristics.   The first case, where the command organizational system is both agile 
and appropriate, is the infamous el-Qaida attack on the U.S. on September 9th, 2001.   
The operational challenge for a small organization like el-Qaida was immense.  
Their target, the U.S., boasted the most powerful armed force in the world; its 
intelligence organizations, despite the popular criticism of today, also were potent – to 
the point of almost intercepting the attack.15 What the attackers chose to do was 
                                          
13 The components of an organizational system are derived from Harold J. Leavitt’s 
Organizational Diagram, found in Leavitt and Homa Bahrami, Managerial Psychology: 
Managing Behavior in Organizations; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
14 Andresen, K., and Gronau, N.: “An Approach to Increase Adaptability in ERP Systems.”  in: 
Managing Modern Organizations with Information Technology : Proceedings of the 2005 
Information Recources Management Association International Conference, 2005. 
15 Of the many books and articles on the 9-11 attack, one consensus favorite in terms of 
accuracy concerning both sides of the story is Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower; New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.  Wright reveals just how close the FBI was to breaking up the 
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conduct asymmetric warfare; assault where one’s enemy was weak.   Where America 
was weak was in its internal security.  That vulnerability enabled the attackers to 
penetrate their target, to hide in plain sight, and to obtain the agents of destruction in 
such a timely fashion as to paralyze the American defenses for just enough time to 
complete the attack.  The el-Qaeda attack showed agility in the variety of places, 
platforms and targets. Their command structure was simple and subtle; it relied on 
elementary codes used during open telephone calls.   The assault leader, Mohammed 
Atta, selected targets and times less than three weeks before the attack.   Individual 
attackers bought their tickets, limiting the visibility of the assault.16   Only one of four 
assaults, United Flight 93, failed to complete its mission.   
The 9-11 attack was appropriate because it fit the situation and it fit the desires 
of its ultimate leader, Usama bin Laden.17 It maximized impact while minimized cost; 
over $27 billion in direct damages with about 3,000 dead was exchanged for about 
$500,000 in operation cost and 19 dead attackers.  Apparently the major weapons of 
destruction that enabled the attackers to take over the aircraft were knives and box 
cutters.18  Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a better example of an agile and 
                                                                                                                                     
attack, only to be foiled by bureaucratic rules that limited cooperation between them and 
the CIA. 
16 This information is from an Al-Jazeera report on the 9-11 attack, shown a year later, and 
also reported by CNN.  Read this story at the following site: 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/12/alqaeda.911.claim/. 
17 Wright, The Looming Tower, page 308. 
18 American economic costs comre from Robert Looney, “Economic costs to the United States 
Stemming from the 9-11 Attacks,” in Strategic Insights, Vol 1, Issue 6 (August 2002).  The 
costs for el Qaeda are from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United 
States, The 9-11 Commission Report, Executive Summary, accessed at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm. 
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appropriate command system, albeit one that inflicted so much pain and suffering on 
this nation. 
At the other end of the spectrum are those command systems that lack both 
agility and appropriateness.  The case study for this is the failed Allied assault on the 
German defenses at Dieppe in 1942. 
Operation JUBILEE, as the Dieppe attack was named, lacked everything that the 
9-11 attack had, including luck.  Although later referred to as a raid, it included a 
reinforced Canadian infantry division, a large proportion of the Royal Air Force fighter 
force, and a significant naval armada.   It ended with the effective combat loss of the 
division (over 50 percent casualties or prisoners), many fighters lost, and another 
Dunkirk-like retreat for the Royal Navy.   There was no real objective for the attack, 
other than to take Dieppe, a coastal city on the French side of the English Channel.   
After taking the city, the attackers were then to withdraw and return to home station.   
The reasons why have never been fully explained.19   
The Allied command system was divided into a triumvirate; ground, sea and air 
had no common leader except in name.20  Each commander pursued his own service 
priorities; this in turn prevented any leverage or force multiplication from the combined 
forces.    Additionally, the plan allowed for no alteration or change called for by the 
immediate situation; it was inflexible, a point strongly commented upon by the ground 
                                          
19 There were many ex post facto reasons stated for the raid, the most common of which was 
a rehearsal for OVERLORD, conducted two years later.  However, that was never discussed 
prior to the attack.  Read Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 
Expedition; London: Aurum, 2006, page 108. 
20 Ibid, pages 272-273. 
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force leader, Canadian Major General J.H. Roberts.21  In this, his German counterpart, 
General Haase agreed.  There was no room to maneuver on the beaches before the 
city, and there were too few troops landed at the flanks to turn them.  Each unit had 
detailed orders as to what and where to go; there was no guidance on what to do if the 
orders turned out to be impossible.   Thus, the landing force became tied up on the 
beaches and vulnerable to inevitable counterattack by the Germans in and about the 
city.22  The outcome of the Allied assault almost was foreordained.   
In short, there was virtually no variety in tempo, in place, in force maneuver, or 
in command for the Allies at Dieppe.  The attacking forces were in an operational 
straightjacket and exposed as such by a far more nimble enemy.  It did not hurt the 
German case that they also knew of the attack hours before it occurred due to a naval 
engagement with the assault force about three hours prior to the landing.23  Agility on 
the Allied side was completely lacking. 
The lack of a clear objective for the assault led to a poor sizing of the attack 
force.  There was no appropriateness or fit to the situation.  As noted above, the 
assault force was too big to achieve real surprise and too little to be able to sustain an 
assault.  In fact, after initially calling the attack a raid, the Allied High Command 
backtracked, calling it a reconnaissance in force.24 The Allied force did not match the 
plan, and the plan did not match the force.  In the aftermath of the assault the Allied 
                                          
21 Terence Robertson, Dieppe: The Shame and the Glory; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962, 
page 405. 
22 Counterattack was a doctrinal concept at the heart of German active defense.   
23 The German Navy intercepted the assault force in the English Channel.  Read Neillands, 
The Dieppe Raid…, pages 131-135. 
24 Robertson, Dieppe…, page 391.   
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leaders reckoned that there was virtually no way that any Allied force of similar size 
could have succeeded.25 It is worth noting here that if one has trouble naming a thing, 
it is likely that one does not have a good idea what that thing is. That is the sad legacy 
of Dieppe. 
The third case presented in this paper is of special interest to American force 
planners today for it involves the case of an agile command system placed in an 
inappropriate setting.  The reason for this interest is that this is precisely the risk that 
the American military today is facing in the transformation of force, doctrine and 
equipment following the Iraq and Afghan wars.26  The issue for the Americans is plain: 
the cost of maintaining a Cold War force capable of engaging enemies across the upper 
portion of the spectrum of conflict, that is conventional operations, is too high while the 
returns on investment in current operations, characterized by insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, are too little.  The desired transformation, to a more agile force, expected 
to be appropriate for foreseeable conflicts is a light, highly mobile and deployable force, 
commanded in a manner that promotes local initiative.27  The risk also is simply stated: 
if the foreseeable conflict environment proves wrong (something that has occurred with 
disturbing regularity), and the conflict environment again moves towards the upper end 
of the spectrum of conflict, then the transformed force will be unable to succeed in such 
                                          
25 Neillands, The Dieppe Raid…, page 272. 
26 Perhaps the foremost critic of the current transformation of doctrine is Lieutenant Colonel 
Gian Gentile, USA.  A concise summary of his thinking is found at the Commentary box on 
the Armed Forces Journal International website, located at 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3207722. 
27 There are many articles and books available that address these issues.  One entire on-line 
journal, the Small Wars Journal, discusses nothing but this transformation.  One book of 
readings that summarizes the avocation of change is Winslow T. Wheeler (editor), America’s 
Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress; 
Washington: Center for Defense Information, 2008. 
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an environment.  In the terms of this paper, the risk is that the force will be 
inappropriate to the operating environment. 
The case illustrating the results of such a risk becoming reality is the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the start of World War I, from August to December, 1914.  
What happened during that period was that the highly capable and competent light 
force that was the BEF, designed for imperial policing and small wars, entered into a 
high-end conventional conflict on the continent of Europe against an expert 
conventional force of Germans.   By the end of the period, the BEF had been destroyed 
as a coherent force, never to return to its pre-war position; the British replaced it with a 
conventional mass army fit to fight a sustained campaign against a conventional foe.28  
The BEF going into Belgium in August, 1914 had to be an agile force with an 
agile command system because of its role within the British empire.  That empire 
spanned most of the earth’s time zones; thus, the force had to be dispersed.  The 
empire was made up of colonies with large indigenous populations; thus the force had 
to be sufficiently robust with significant local participation in that force.  Being a very 
large empire at a time when communications limited the direction that the center of the 
empire could give meant that the command system had to be able to take matters into 
its own hand, confident that it kept the imperial intent in mind.   Finally, in addition to 
the mere large distance within the empire, the variety of cultures and terrain meant 
that the force had to be adaptive to many different operating environments.  The fact 
                                          
28 An excellent technical and analytical history of the British force can be found in Nikolas 
Gardner, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914; Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2003. 
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that for almost two hundred years that force had maintained order and contributed to 
the expansion of the British empire meant that overall the force was effective.29   
The way the British army succeeded in its “small wars” worked against its 
success in World War I.  Such wars were fought by relatively small formations of British 
regulars, augmented by larger indigenous units, over a large land area.  While this led 
to tactical proficiency of units and leaders, it did nothing for high level command 
capabilities.  In fact, field leaders often took a Nelsonian “blind eye” to the dictates of 
high command when they felt circumstances required it.30  Similarly, such a force 
required its commanders in the field, not in school or on staff.  Thus, the British force 
was relatively inexperienced and ignorant of operational and strategic command 
necessities at the outbreak of World War I.31 The British prided themselves in their 
small units, the regiments, that had proven themselves in the imperial wars as well as 
in the Napoleonic wars.  This contributed to the centrifugal relationship between 
subordinate (regimental) command and higher formations (without the regimental 
traditions.) 
                                          
29 A readable popular history of the British Imperial Army during the bulk of this time can be 
found with Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars; New York: W.W. Norton, 1985.  I 
write that overall the force was effective; however, there were some spectacular defeats as 
well, like Afghanistan in 1842, the Indian Mutiny in 1857, and Isandlwanda in 1879.  In each 
case of defeat, though, the British rebounded successfully. 
30 One finds evidence of this convenient ignorance of high command orders in Winston S. 
Churchill’s colorful and informative journalistic history, The Story of the Malakand Field 
Force: An Episode of Frontier War; Rockville, Maryland: Arc Manor, 2008. 
31 Gardner, Trail by Fire, pages 21-23.  Also Martin Samuels, Command or Control?  
Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918; London: 
Cass, 1995, Chapter 2.  What they did learn, according to Samuels, unfortunately turned out 
to be counterproductive in many cases.  For example, the idea of restrictive control on the 
battlefield and command “umpiring” spelled hesitation and lost opportunities later in the 
war. 
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The British Army, formed for battle against the Germans as the BEF, was a 
battle-proven force, able to shift focus quickly to rapidly emerging situations, but 
encumbered by an inexperienced higher command structure that acted like a small unit 
command and staff; the high command had a distinct tendency to micro-management, 
a quirk that enhanced argumentation between and among commands, and an 
inevitable slowness of action.  The field force was highly agile, capable of producing and 
adapting to many varieties of opposition, terrain, and equipment.  What it could not do 
was overcome its own leadership.   
With a schizophrenic command system, both agile and slow simultaneously, the 
British force also suffered from a lack of appropriate doctrine and equipment to face the 
German attack.   The British had no heavy artillery, too few machine guns, too little 
ammunition for the artillery it had, and too many cavalry horses at the start of the 
war.32  Of course, this reflected the BEF’s requirements for imperial small wars.  It did 
not fit on the modern conventional battlefield.  However, the force could and did learn, 
though at great cost.  The BEF’s expert troops, highly disciplined and trained, exacted a 
high price from the German attackers; nonetheless, they had to retreat out of Belgium 
and into France, a distance that would be regained only after four years of bloody 
attrition warfare. 
The fourth and final case concerns the situation where a relatively non-agile 
military command system operates in an appropriate environment.   This case is the 
                                          
32 Robin Neillands (again), The Old Contemptibles: The British Expeditionary Force, 1914; 
London: John Murray, 2004.  Chapter 4 discusses the British problems with mobilization and 
deployment of the BEF, with special attention on pp. 95-96 to its organization and 
limitations. 
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Union Army of the Potomac under Lieutenant General (LTG) Ulysses Grant during the 
Wilderness Campaign in 1864.  The choice may be surprising to those who are familiar 
with Grant’s experience in that war; one could easily use his campaign at Vicksburg in 
1863 to illustrate an agile and appropriate force at work.  The Grant of 1863’s Vicksburg 
is not the Grant of 1864’s Wilderness.  Most importantly, Grant in 1864 has a much 
different army than the one in 1863.   At Vicksburg, he commanded the Army of 
Tennessee with generals that, after some time, believed in his leadership; foremost 
among these was William Tecumseh Sherman, who would eventually succeed Grant 
when the latter moved East to take over all the Union armies.  The troops of Grant’s 
western force were a victorious and experienced group; when Grant left them they had 
just lifted the siege at Chattanooga, including a spontaneous and successful assault 
against Confederate lines on Missionary Ridge.    The Army of Tennessee had a definite 
esprit de corps.  The Army of the Potomac had a record of defeat at the hands of the 
Confederate forces led by General Robert E. Lee, beginning with Bull Run in July, 1861.   
The singular exception to that record was Gettysburg in 1863, but that decisive victory 
did not lead to a follow-up pursuit to smash the Confederates; instead, the Union and 
Confederate forces took up winter fortifications along the Mine Run region of central 
Virginia.    That slowness or lack of agility was what led President Lincoln to call for 
Grant to come east and hopefully perform some of his leadership magic with the Union 
forces.   Grant did not directly command the Army of the Potomac; Lieutenant General 
(LTG) George Meade was its leader.  Grant exerted his command of all Union forces in 
the field, observing and assisting Meade.  Grant inherited a Union Army leadership that 
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had at best performed with mixed results.  Some leaders were superb, like Winfield 
Scott Hancock; others were abominable, like Ambrose P. Burnside.  All worked in a 
politicized military environment that had been the result of a theater of operations 
immediately proximate to the nation’s capital.  Thus, the senior leadership of the Union 
Army tended to fight one campaign with the Confederates while waging another with 
the government and the press for popular favor.33   
Grant had built an agile force in the West, capable of adapting its face and pace 
despite changing foes, terrain, and maneuvers.   Often, he did not even have to spell 
out what he wanted from his army; his subordinates knew what the intent was and 
pursued their actions consistent with that intent.   The actions of General William T. 
Sherman, who served with Grant throughout the latter’s command in the West, reflect 
this characteristic.   Sherman often disagreed with Grant on the particulars of 
conducting a campaign while agreeing with Grant on the principle of the thing; this was 
the case at Chattanooga in 1863, at Atlanta in 1864, and at negotiations to end the war 
in 1865.  Grant always supported and sometimes deferred to his subordinate’s 
opinions.34  This was an agile command system at work. 
Grant had assumed that the Army of the Potomac could act the same way.  In 
that regard, he was wrong.  The Army of the Potomac was a competent and highly 
                                          
33 There are hundreds of books on the Army of the Potomac.  The focus here mainly is on the 
leadership.  Hence consult Stephen R. Taafe, Commanding the Army of the Potomac; 
Manhattan, Kansas; University of Kansas Press, 2006.  Also read Steven Woolworth’s 
(editor) Grant’s Lieutenants: From Chattanooga to Appomattox ; Manhattan, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 2008.  Of course, one can always rely on the man speaking for 
himself, read Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant; New York: Cosimo 
Classics, 2007 (most recent edition.) 
34 John F. Marzalek, “Take the Seat of Honor: William T. Sherman,” in Woolworth (editor), 
Grant’s Lieutenants…, pages 5-22. 
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experienced fighting force; the weakness was in its leadership.  By the time Grant took 
command of all Union armies, the problem at the top of the Army of the Potomac had 
resolved itself in that LTG Meade proved a dependable if cautious commander.  The 
problem of senior leadership was that the corps commanders and division commanders 
still proved uneven in quality and too politicized to concentrate on the military tasks at 
hand; overall, the Army was ponderous to move and slow to fight.35 Using the language 
of agility, the Army’s command system demonstrated a limited repertoire of variety in 
its maneuver and pace; it repeatedly found itself on the outside of the competing 
decision cycles with Lee’s Army of Virginia.   This tendency continued throughout the 
three major battles comprising the Wilderness campaign in the Spring, 1864.  Each 
engagement occurred when Grant directed the Army to move on Lee’s flank; each time, 
Lee anticipated and beat Meade to the place and punch.  The result was a series of 
bloody, exhausting battles of attrition that wasted much of the Army of the Potomac’s 
battle experience.  What was less known at the time, except to Grant’s instincts, was 
that Lee’s Army, having less manpower than the Union to start with, also was severely 
struck.  Both sides were exhausted from the season long campaign.   
After the campaign came to a halt in front of Richmond and Petersburg, Grant 
realized the limitations of the Army, and, as was his trademark, adjusted his modus 
operandi to a siege.  He also began to significantly replace the senior leaders of the 
Army of the Potomac with officers he believed were tuned to his way of action.36   By 
the beginning of the Spring, 1865 campaign, the Army of the Potomac bore the distinct 
                                          
35 Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969, pages 165-167.   
36 Catton, Grant Takes Command…, pages 409-413. 
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imprint of Grant army; it showed itself thus during the pursuit phase following the fall of 
Richmond and Petersburg, to Appomattox Court House. 
Why was the Army of the Potomac command system appropriate to the situation 
facing it at the start of the Wilderness campaign?  It was so because that Army had 
suffered through three campaigns of battle; almost literally, the command system had 
been forged in the heat of combat over and over again.  The command system and the 
force that system employed only awaited the quality of leadership to make its power 
felt.   When Grant took over, the mesh of sword and swordsman became complete.  
This author believes that in the Spring of 1865 no power among the industrialized 
nations of the earth had armies such as those commanded by U.S. Grant and his senior 
leadership.         
 
SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has looked at the issue of agility, refined its definition, and found it 
incomplete as an explanation for success or failure of command systems.  The paper 
has proposed a complementary concept, appropriateness,  to add power to the idea of 
agility.  Together, the concepts appear necessary and sufficient to explain why 
command organizational systems work or do not work.  It has presented four case 
studies to demonstrate the validity of this argument.   More cases could be presented, 
however they merely duplicate the findings of the four illustrated in this paper; in 
researching this paper, this author found no exceptions to the typology and 
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agility/appropriateness matrix described here.  Figure 1 below provide some examples 
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    FIGURE 1 
     AGILITY VS. APPROPRIATENESS 
The typology appears useful as an explanatory model. 
 There are two major lessons to take from this analysis and discussion. They may 
appear obvious, but the subtleties are in the details.   First, it is clear that one size or 
solution for all circumstances, that is ignoring appropriateness, is a mistake of at least 
operational if not strategic proportions.   The side that chooses to ignore 
appropriateness must be prepared to win in spite of itself and with great cost; it cannot 
be immune to long casualty lists.   Second, if both agility and appropriateness are 
ignored, and the issue still won, then the concepts are more operational than strategic.  
Again, however, if ignoring appropriateness leads to casualties, ignoring both leads to 
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bloodbaths.  A glance at the lower left hand quarter of Figure 1 should provide evidence 
of the blood and treasure that must be expended if these two concepts are not 
addressed prior to battle. 
The U.S. military in the early 21st Century is one that must be husbanded carefully; it is 
an expensive force in terms of monetary and political cost.  Placing that force in harm’s 
way without consideration of these two factors risks not only the force, it risks the 
future of the decision-makers who deliberately ignore agility and appropriateness in the 
hope of a positive decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
